I. Introduction
Use of the characteristics of collective bargaining to help motivate analysis of wage and employment outcomes occupies an important position in contemporary treatments of the covariation of institutions and macroeconomic outcomes. Thus, notions of the importance of the centralization of collective bargaining (or its absence) to wage and unemployment development figured heavily in policy discussions in the 1980s (Calmfors and Driffill, 1993) . More recently, the importance of centralization has been supplemented if not supplanted by notions of coordination (e.g. OECD, 2004, Chapter 3) . Vulgo: more centralized bargaining regimes -latterly, more coordinated ones -have been held out as offering scope for improved economic performance.
One important issue that has arisen is the stability of the bargaining structure (and of that of labour institutions more generally) through time. At best, bargaining structures -centralized, decentralized, and/or coordinated -have been observed at a few points in time, and insufficient attention has been paid to within-country changes. This seems singularly inappropriate when industrial relations systems are evidently under sustained stress. At another level, most studies investigating time-varying changes in collective bargaining have with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Dustman, Ludsteck, and Schönberg, 2009 ) focused on union density. This strategy also seems inadequate given that union density and collective bargaining coverage are far from being perfectly correlated.
In the present study we will focus on Germany, the exemplar of moderately centralized but wellcoordinated industrial relations in continental Europe, and the interval [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Despite its longstanding reputation as a beacon of stability, however, the German case is also of particular interest given the recent signs of atrophy in its industrial relations architecture. Here we refer of course to the erosion of sectoral (i.e. industry-wide) collective bargaining.
The four component parts of this paper should be seen as proceeding in tandem. First, we offer descriptive information on the hemorrhaging of collective bargaining. This material not only plays an important part in scene setting but also hints at the potential importance of certain variables (viz. establishment size and region) while providing some practical justification for our subsequent concatenation of the categories of sectoral and firm-level bargaining into a single "any collective bargaining composite." Second, a decomposition exercise, based on two cross sections of the data not only confirms an earlier result in the literature that the decline in collective bargaining cannot be attributed to changes in the make-up of the workforce or in establishment characteristics (see, in particular, Addison et al. 2011) , but also introduces the full set of arguments to be used in the rest of our analysis. Importantly, it also establishes the case for treating establishment heterogeneity more directly.
Third, our random effects treatment of collective bargaining propensity is grounded in this recognition, exploiting a longitudinal panel to explain why some establishments may be expected to be covered by collective agreements while others are likely to populate a zone free of collective bargaining. Besides addressing the role of the covariates, it also quantifies the inertia in collective bargaining status. Finally, we turn to the factors that induce failure, examining transitions into or out of a collective agreement. Our survival modeling of collective bargaining takes the analysis of inertia and contract determination one crucial stage further. It is at once the major contribution of the paper and culmination of a lock-step treatment of change and persistence in the German model.
The novelty of our approach stems from the fact that the panel we analyze is long enough to follow some establishments from the outset (i.e. from their birth) to the point of 'failure', here the year in which they switch collective bargaining regime. For these cases, we provide the first estimates of the median duration of coverage, as well as the main determinants of the decision to leave/join a collective agreement. A second innovation involves an analysis of the duration of coverage of panel stayers via the use of a simulated counterfactual. Panel stayers are all those establishments that are left-censored in 2000 (i.e. those with unknown elapsed time of coverage in the year the establishment is first observed).
The use of a nine year observation window in this study is a significant departure from standard cross-section analyses and from panel studies that rely on two distinct moments in time (consecutive or not). Our approach proves fruitful in the sense that it allows us to tackle the determinants of coverage (or absence of coverage) without assuming away unobserved establishment heterogeneity, while at the same time yielding estimates of the duration of different collective bargaining regimes. In the former case, we can ultimately estimate the odds of being covered (uncovered) by collective bargaining at different moments in time. In the latter case, we can model the probability that a given establishment will switch out of (or into) a collective agreement given that it was covered (uncovered) up to certain point in time.
Both aspects assist us in interpreting the ongoing decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany.
II. Preliminaries: The Decline in Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation
Recent studies have documented a shift in the locus of wage bargaining from industry-wide sectoral bargaining to lower levels, both firm-level collective agreements and, much more importantly of late, individual bargains or contracts between the worker and the firm (see Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003a,b; Addison et al., 2010 Addison et al., , 2011 Kohaut, 2010, 2011) . There has also occurred a decentralization within sectoral agreements themselves, which development has stimulated a distinct debate as to whether the process is internally destabilizing or not (see, inter al., Hassel, 1999 Hassel, , 2002 Klikauer, 2002; Frege, 2003; Doellgast and Greer, 2007; Haipeter and Lehndorff, 2009; Bispinnck et al., 2010) . In any event, the decentralization of sectoral bargaining -occasioned by opening clauses and pacts for competitiveness (see, respectively, Schnabel and Kohaut, 2007; Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005 ) -has inevitably narrowed the distinction between sectoral and firm-level collective agreements and may also have militated against further growth in the latter. Partly for this reason, once we have charted the course of all types of agreement in the descriptive part of the present exercise, we will subsequently collapse sectoral and firm-level collective bargaining into a single "any collective bargaining" composite for analytical purposes. But in so doing we do not wish to understate the importance of external erosion, namely the sustained increase in the percentage of establishments and employees not covered by any type of collective agreement.
Since the data used in the present exercise differ in a small number of respects from those used in other studies, 1 it is first necessary to provide information on this process of change in collective bargaining. (The Data Appendix succinctly describes our database.) The main trends over the years [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] are charted in Table A .1 by employment and establishment coverage. The most notable features of the reported values are the decrease in sectoral bargaining and the rise of the collective bargaining free zone. Thus, the share of workers (establishments) covered by sectoral agreements has fallen by 9.5 (11.9) percentage points to 49.2 (36.4) percent, while the share of workers (establishments) without any collective bargaining has correspondingly grown by 8.5 (11.9) percentage points to 42.8 (60.8) percent.
The decline in sectoral bargaining has occurred in both eastern and western Germany, even if the rate of decline in bargaining coverage has been more pronounced in the latter region. Interestingly, there has been very little change in firm-level bargaining in terms of establishment coverage, even if employment coverage has risen modestly in both parts of Germany and is higher in eastern Germany.
Coverage rates by establishment size are contained in Table A A further breakdown of the data by region reveals some differences, while confirming the broad differences between plants of different size and trends in sectoral agreements and no collective agreements. First, absence of collective bargaining is and has remained more important in eastern Germany even if the growth rates are proportionately smaller than in western Germany, especially among smaller establishments. Second, and conversely, sectoral bargaining coverage is lower among smaller and larger establishments in eastern Germany, although the decline has now been proportionately greater among larger east German establishments. Finally, firm-level bargaining is roughly twice as important in eastern Germany for both sizes of establishment than in westerm Germany and any recorded growth is also higher in the east although confined to larger establishments. and IV below). The broad rationale for their inclusion is to be found in for example Willman, Bryson, and Gomez's (2007) modeling of employer voice-choice decisions. Based on the argument that firms face non-trivial switching costs (i.e. costs connected with uncertainty surrounding the benefits from moving from coverage to non-coverage, and vice-versa), one would expect the returns to being covered by collective agreements to be higher in large establishments and in plants integrated in multi-site establishments. Establishments with a higher proportion of low-skill employees are also likely to rely less on voice mechanisms and therefore expected to be associated with a lower presence of collective agreements. By the same token, older establishments are more likely to be covered given that the incidence of collective bargaining tended to be higher in the past. Alternatively, recently established businesses often require more flexible institutional arrangements at early stages of their existence (see Schnabel et al., 2006 Interestingly, the dominance of the within effect is no less pronounced in eastern Germany where the decline in overall collective bargaining has been less acute than in western Germany. Panels (b) and (c) of the table repeat the decomposition exercise for the two sub-periods, 2000-2004 and 2005-2008, respectively. (The unemployment peak of 11.7 percent in 2005 provides the basis for the cutoff year.) As it is apparent, the within effect is also clearly dominant in both sub-periods.
It is the precisely this limited role of observables found in decompositions based on the 2000 and 2008 cross-sections that sets the stage for our subsequent longitudinal analysis of the propensity of a given establishment to be covered. Essentially, the large within effect we have estimated implies that one has to treat establishment heterogeneity more directly. With these preliminaries behind us, we now turn to a closer examination of this issue.
III. Collective Bargaining Coverage Propensity
Let Y it represent the coverage outcome for the t th observation in the i th establishment. Given the random effect i u which represents the establishment's persistent unobserved traits, namely its unobserved propensity to be covered by a collective agreement, the random-effects probit model can be specified as
where is the standard cumulative distribution function and | . Model assumptions are therefore that and are independent and that has a normal distribution.
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includes all observed establishment characteristics that have an impact on the binary response probability, and denotes the set of parameters to be estimated. 4 As before, the arguments are establishment size, the proportion of skilled Running our random-effects probit separately for the two halves of Germany indicates the consistent influences of establishment size and age, proportion of skilled workers, and single-establishment firm status on propensity to be covered. However, the role of foreign ownership in promoting coverage clearly reflects the situation in eastern Germany, while the negative but statistically insignificant influence of workforce proportion female found for Germany as a whole masks the marginally significant effect of that argument for western Germany.
Of interest is the high value of -the intra-class (establishment) correlation defined abovewhich at 0.93 indicates considerable inertia in collective bargaining status. In short, there is strong evidence that, after controlling for the , the probabilities of an establishment being covered in any t 0 and t 1 are highly correlated. (The presence of non-trivial switching costs, referred to earlier, may of course lie at the root of this outcome.) Equivalently, the magnitude of (at 3.71) implies that a small difference in unobserved traits entails a quite different propensity of being covered by a collective agreement. Also note that since the significance test for is itself a test for the presence of the unobserved effect ( if and only if , we can reject the simple pooled probit as an appropriate model description of the data.
( Table 2 near here)
The manifest intra-class correlation across distinct percentiles is given in Table 2 . 5 Let us focus on the median percentile. Thus, setting the linear predictor at the median (the 0.50 column), the intra-class correlation is 0.76, flagging substantive within group persistence. Note also that for the median percentile, the corresponding joint probability in the second row (i.e. the probability of being covered in two given years) is equal to 0.47. In turn, the corresponding marginal probability of being covered by any type of agreement in any given year is 0.53 (first row), which closely tracks the (unweighted) mean coverage rate observed in the sample, at 52.7 percent. 6 Finally, the odds ratio in the fourth row indicates that the odds of an establishment being covered in t 0 and t 1 versus not being covered in t 0 but covered in t 1 are 56.2 times higher for the same observed characteristics. Since the odds ratio contrasts the (same) behaviour of two establishments in t 1 , given that in t 0 they may have behaved differently, the conclusion is that it is considerably more likely that establishments that are covered will stay covered than non-covered establishments will join. Inertia in non-coverage is therefore very strong as well.
A glance at the full range of results presented in Table 2 reveals that the 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 percentiles imply both a Pearson's r and an odds ratio that are very close to each other, while the marginal probability and the joint probability statistics exhibit a greater degree of variability. Interestingly, using
Pearson's r, the 0.01 and the 0.99 percentiles show approximately the same degree of inertia in collective bargaining status, while the two very high odds ratios show that it is a considerably more likely that establishments in these two groups will stay covered in any two periods than join a collective agreement of any type.
Finally, by squaring the Pearson's r coefficient (at the median percentile), we obtain the result that collective bargaining coverage in a given year explains about 58 percent of the variation in collective bargaining behaviour in another year. The inference is that there is no terminal inertia in collective bargaining status, which result offers more than sufficient justification for an analysis of transitions into and out of collective bargaining.
IV. Transitions and Collective Bargaining 'Survivability'
We have seen that certain characteristics are associated with collective bargaining coverage. But can we say that the longer lasting its coverage, the less likely an establishment will be to change bargaining status? Our concern is now with the specific factors that induce failure, that is, transitions into or out of a collective agreement. The proper context for such analysis is survival modeling.
In our observation window, we have a maximum of nine annual observations which is insufficient to allow us to follow all production units from outset (birth) to death. The typical unit in our panel is indeed one that was born before 2000 and surveyed over a certain number of years within the observation interval. . In general, we will not be able to know the exact length of all spells because it is simply not possible to recover the 'missing'
information. On the other hand, newly-founded establishments -and, to some extent, permanent establishments (i.e. panel stayers) -are a special case and they will be used to explain the survivability of collective bargaining. Again in the interests of expositional convenience, we focus on the aggregate category of collective agreements of any type.
(Figure 1 near here)
In the limit, the probability of failure, given by the hazard function, is constant and independent of any establishment attribute. This case is not particularly helpful in the present context since we believe that the selected covariates do have an impact on the hazard rate. Thus, we assume that leaving (or joining) a collective agreement of any type is a function of an observed set of time-constant (e.g. industry dummies) and time-varying (e.g. establishment size) covariates. 
where and are the same functions for all establishments and is the vector of the selected covariates (see, for example, Lancaster, 1990, Chapter 3) . Setting , and ,
we have the standard Cox proportional hazards model ,
where is the baseline hazard (or the hazard rate when all covariates are set at zero). 9 Thus, denotes, for covered (uncovered) establishments, the probability of an establishment leaving (joining) a collective agreement of any type, given that it has been covered (uncovered) up to time t. Given the longitudinal nature of our dataset, the standard errors of the estimated hazard coefficients are adjusted to account for the possible intra-group (establishment) correlation.
We also used parametric methods so that we can compare (a) PH estimates from both parametric (Weibull) and semiparametric (Cox) models, and (b) parametric estimates across a variety of models (Weibull, log-normal, and log-logistic). 10 Typically, and again omitting the subscript denoting the individual (establishment), a parametric model is written (in accelerated failure-time form) as , with denoting the logarithm of the survival time, and the error term. z can assume different distributional forms, determining the regression model.
As mentioned earlier, we have both stock and flow sampling in our data, in the sense that we are able to observe entrants (newly-founded establishments) and non-entrants (i.e. establishments born at some point in the pre-observation period. 11 In the case of non-entrants, for whom left-censoring is the key problem, some further data manipulation will be required. For entrants, the survival analysis is straighforward since all spells for these units are either complete or right censored. In this context, the subsample of births turns out to be extremely useful, and we will discuss below the extent to which inferences based on births can be carried forward, first, to the subset of permanent establishments and then to the entire sample of surveyed units.
( Table 3 near here)
As shown in Table 3, we observed over an average period of 2.6 years before switching to a different regime or leaving the panel.
Interestingly, the expected year of exit for our sample is virtually the same for covered and uncovered establishments. In any event, for establishments born later in the period, the average number of years prior to exit is necessarily smaller given that their number of years in the observation window becomes shorter.
From the total number of births in our dataset, and ignoring the 2007 cohort for which no transitions can be observed, in 52.2 percent of the cases establishments remain uncovered and 37.9 percent remain covered. This implies, as we have seen, that in 9.9 percent [100-(52.2+37.9)] of the cases we do observe establishments changing -either leaving or joining -their collective agreement status. Of those plants that are covered in the year of birth (plus one), some 12.8 percent do switch out of collective agreement within the observation window, while 7.7 percent of their non-covered counterparts will join a collective agreement. (Multiple failures -establishments with more than one transition over the observation period -are now dropped from our sample.) 12 The results of model (2) -the hazard function -are presented in Table 4 for the two possible failure events: leaving a collective agreement or joining one. And in the last row of the table is given the median duration of "coverage/uncoverage", based on a PH exponential model without covariates.
According to our estimates, the median duration of coverage for newly-founded establishments is 1.81 years, while the median duration without coverage is 2.61 years.
(Tables 4 and 4A near here)
As for the role of the selected covariates, greater establishment size decreases the probability of leaving a collective agreement, as does the use of modern technology. In contrast, foreign ownership and single-establishment status are associated with a higher failure rate. Note that the role of singleestablishment status and foreign-owned variables are particularly strong; in particular, being a single establishment implies an 83 percent higher hazard rate, while foreign-ownership increases the hazard by 58 percent. In turn, a 1 percent increase in establishment size reduces the hazard by 0.35 percent. All other covariates included in the regression are not statistically significant.
The results for joining a collective agreement of any sort (given in the second column of Table 4) look symmetric. In particular, whereas the probability of leaving a collective agreement is found in the first column of the table to be decreasing in employment size, it is increasing in employment size when it comes to joining an agreement. But no other covariate is found to be statistically significant. Vulgo: establishment size is the major determinant of joining a collective agreement. That the evidence is much weaker in the case of transitions into collective agreements is not altogether unexpected given the smaller number of establishments engaging in such switching behaviour.
As shown in the penultimate row of Table 4 , we do not find any evidence that the PH assumption has been violated, either in the case of leavers (first column of the table) or joiners (second column). For completeness, however, we also provide in Table 4A both the (PH) Weibull estimates and the non-PH parametric estimates from the log-normal and log-logistic models. First of all, observe that the median duration calculation from assuming a Weibull distribution rather than the exponential case is practically unchanged (cf. 1.81 in Table 4 with 1.89 in Table 4A in the case of leavers, and 2.61 in Table 4 with 2.58
in Table 4A for joiners). Second of all, by multiplying the Weibull coefficient in AFT form (see the first and second columns of Table 4A ) by the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution, p, we obtain the corresponding Cox model coefficient. The comparison is quite striking in that (a) the sign of each coefficient is exactly the same, (b) their statistical significance is virtually unchanged, and (c) their magnitude is very close -striking but not surprising, as we did not reject the PH assumption in Table 4 . Table 4A also presents the results from two other parametric implementations, namely the lognormal and the log-logistic cases. Here we have to compare across the first, third and fifth columns, on the one hand, and across the second, fourth and sixth columns on the other. Again the results are very reassuring, in terms of the signs, statistical significance, and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients.
Given these results, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), reported in the table, does not vary much across the selected alternatives, with the log-normal case giving the best fit (the smaller is the AIC value, the better).
It will be recalled that in our observation window all units are left-censored except for newlyfounded plants. Since we cannot recoup the entire record of participation in collective bargaining for the former units, we can either ignore all transitions other than those observed for births or, alternatively, we can try to figure out an alternative procedure that avoids losing the valuable transition information we have on other types of establishments.
We elected to follow the second route, and therefore create a pre-observation period in which collective agreement status is unchanged for all units included in the risk analysis. To this end, we ( The corresponding survival analysis, shown in the first column of Table 5 , again indicates that establishment size is critical: the larger the establishment, the lower the probability that a covered establishment will leave a collective agreement. The single establishment variable is also statistically significant and positively signed as expected. The remaining variables are statistically insignificant. In turn, as shown in the second column of the table, joining collective agreements is less common among permanent stayers than among newly-founded establishments. Not surprisingly, therefore, all variables in the second column are statistically insignificant, with the sole exception of the establishment age dummy.
In this case, older establishments tend to have a lower exit rate (from non-coverage). Apparently, noncovered establishments tend to stay non-covered, while the considerable minority that join collective agreements do not seem to share any readily discernible characteristics.
( Table 5 near here)
The second experiment -the counterfactual -is reproduced in Table 6 . In this exercise, we added some 47 establishments to the sample in the first column of Table 5 . The results are basically unchanged.
The same obtains with respect to the transition behaviour of initially uncovered establishments, shown in the second column, where some 100 establishments have been added to the sample. The main lesson from the counterfactual is, then, that within the subsample of permanent establishments there seems to be no particular penalty in ignoring left-censoring.
( Tables 6 and 7 near here) Given these findings, the final step is to present the survival analysis for the full set of permanent establishments. This procedure yields an enlarged estimation sample of 1,597 units, surveyed Table 7 ), we also ran the corresponding parametric models for all cases contained in Tables 5 through 7 . The results are not reported here but are available from the authors upon request. The principal findings are twofold. First, in both sign and statistical significance, the estimated coefficients are practically unchanged vis-à-vis those shown in Tables 5 through 7 -even in the case where the PH test rejected the null. Second, although the differences across the three parametric models are minor, the log-normal model offers the best fit.
V. Conclusions
We obtain confirmation in this study of the steady decline of sectoral bargaining in one of its hitherto more entrenched country settings. We can also confirm that the main source of the observed decline is attributable to (unexplained) establishment behaviour, holding establishment characteristics constant, rather than to any particularly unfavourable changes in observed characteristics.
More importantly, the analysis of the determinants of collective bargaining membership is in accordance with some of not all of our priors; that is, the skill content of the workforce, and the age and size of the establishment increase the propensity to be covered, while single-establishement status decreases it.
But we have also detected strong inertia in collective bargaining status, having controlled for establishment characteristics. This result is not unexpected given the long lasting presence of industrywide agreeements in Germany. Specifically, we estimate that the odds of an establishment being covered in two different years, say t 0 and t 1 , versus not being covered in t 0 but covered in t 1 are more than 50 times higher for the same observed characteristics.
Nevertheless, despite this observed persistence in collective agreements (and, equivalently, in their absence), establishments do switch their collective bargaining status. In this context, the finding that coverage (and absence of coverage) has a short half-life in the case of newly-founded establishments is of particular importance as it proves that collective bargaining is also volatile. Moreover, the finding that the estimated duration of coverage is shorter than the duration of no coverage, for this sample of establishments, also provides an interesting explanation for the observed decline in collective bargaining over the sample period.
Finally, the results from the survival analysis on the subset of left-censored permanent establishments show that the factors governing the decision to leave/join are after all general and not specific to any subset of establishments. Expressed another way, plant size and skill content matter in the decision to join, while single-plant establishments with outdated technology may be those opting out of collective agreeements.
The present treatment offers for the first time estimates of the median duration of coverage for newly-founded establishments. Further, using a set of counterfactual exercises, it is also shown that the determinants of collective bargaining transitions can be comfortably generalized to all types of establishments, both new and old. Our results are moreover robust to a variety of specifications. At root they suggest that, whatever position is taken on the current state of the German model, there is sufficient across-the-board variability in establishment behavior to indicate no lack of vitality.
Endnotes
1. In particular, we used a more restrictive definition of not-for-profit organizations while at the same time imputing collective bargaining status in all cases where one-year status changes likely reflected coding error (see the Data Appendix). A more restrictive definition of not-for-profit organizations means that we dropped not only public corporations from the sample but also those establishments that reported a "total budget" rather than sales volume. On net, these innovations resulted in a slightly larger sample; specifically, an additional 5,000 observations. 2. A different choice of reference groups would yield and for the between and within effects, respectively. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of the reference groups.
3. Unfortunately, not imposing these restrictions on the relationship between and , in the spirit of the fixed-effects analysis, is infeasible due to the incidental parameters problem (Wooldridge, 2002: 484) . We cannot therefore offer any fixed-effects versus random-effects test. As it will be shown below, we can easily reject the null of no presence of the unobserved effect, . This finding is the reason why we do not provide any results based on a simple pooled probit specification. Finally, relaxing the randomeffects model assumptions is a complex issue that is beyond the scope of the present paper the main goal of which is to provide indicative estimates of the propensity to be covered by a collective agreement.
The equivalent latent variable model is given by
where is the latent variable and , with uncorrelated with . Assuming | | , model (1) follows readily.
5. We cannot perform a similar exercise for ρ since it does not depend on the marginal distribution.
6. 52 percent is the unweighted average coverage rate in the estimation sample. According to Table A.3, the weighted average is necessarily lower than 51.2 percent as the coverage rate is roughly monotonically decreasing over the 2000-2008 period. The difference between weigthed and non-weigthed averages has to do with the well-known over-representation of large firms in the IAB survey.
7. We note that by 'failure' we mean an exit from a given collective bargaining state, not an exit from the market (death). All establishment deaths were excluded from the panel.
8. For the time-varying covariates, we shall ignore possible anticipation and delay effects. We shall also assume that the effect of any continuous variable on the hazard is independent of the level of the variable (i.e. the marginal effect is constant). A model without covariates will be used to obtain the predicted median duration of coverage/absence of coverage for newly-founded establishments (see last row of Table 4 ).
9. Formally, the model in equation (3) is PH with time-invariant covariates. The corresponding PH model with time-varying variables is given by (see Wooldridge, 2002: 693) .
10. The generalized gamma model did not achieve convergence in our implementation. Since the number of transitions is limited in our dataset and the set of selected covariates includes a number of dummy variables, this result is not overly surprising. We eschewed reducing the set of regressors in order to achieve convergence of the generalized gamma given the need to work a uniform set of covariates throughout the paper.
11. The year of birth of any establishment in the panel is always known. Only the bargaining status in the pre-observation period is unknown.
12. The number of multiple failures in the sample of births is 195, out of 2,874 cases (or 6.8 percent). Of all these multiple failures, 76 percent record more than two switches, which we regard as indicative of bad measurement. Accordingly, all multiple failures were excluded from our regressions. We should further note that transitions are even less frequent among permanent establishments (cf . Tables 5 through  7 ) and therefore for this subsample multiple collective bargaining changes are a matter of still less concern.
13. For transitions into collective agreements, this amounts to adding the following sequences to the existing restricted sample of permanents: 0111|11111, 0011|11111, 0001|11111, and 0000|11111. In the case of transitions out of collective agreements, we add the sequences 1111|00000, 1110|00000, 1100|00000, and 1000|00000. The vertical bar in these sequences denotes the 2003 separation point and '1' ('0') signifies coverage (absence of coverage or 'uncoverage'). The 2004-2008 interval defines the risk period.
Data Appendix
Our data is extracted from the IAB Establishment Panel (or Betriebspanel), which is based on a stratified random sample of plants from the population of all establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance. A full description of the Betriebspanel is provided by Fischer et al. (2009) . We confine our remarks here to outlining the procedures used to generate our various estimation samples.
Firstly, we took the 2008 survey and appended to it all previous surveys back to 2000. We decided not to range further back in time primarily to avoid having to deal with changes in industry classification in 2000 (from a 3-to a 5-digit system), while extending the sample beyond 2008 would also require further manipulation of the data as industries were again reclassified in 2009. Secondly, we focus on establishments from the private, profit-oriented sector of the economy with at least 5 employees.
Smaller establishments were excised on pragmatic grounds: they typically evince more spurious volatility in collective bargaining coverage. In total, we have 9 surveys (from 2000 through 2008), encompassing some 82,000 observations on approximately 24,000 establishments in the whole of Germany. We note that our criteria for excluding not-for-profit organizations implied that all public-sector units were excluded from the sample, as well as all those institutions that failed to report some sales volume.
The constructed longitudinal dataset (i.e. the panel in which establishments are followed over time for a maximum period of nine years) is used to analyze collective bargaining membership, on the one hand, and the duration of collective agreements, on the other. Note that in general we do not know the elapsed duration of the observed spells. That is to say, we do not know the number of years in which a given establishment has been either covered or uncovered at the point it is first observed in the survey. All establishments are therefore left-truncated, with the notable exception of the newly-founded establishments (i.e. births) that we were able to follow from the outset. To ensure that the year of birth coded in the survey panel was correct, we used the establishment register (or Betriebsdatei) and the fact that establishments in the two raw datasets (i.e. Betriebsdatei and Betriebspanel) share exactly the same identification code (or Betriebsnummer). Finally, in coding the collective agreement variable, we assumed that if the status in year t-1 was the same as in year t+1, then the status in year t was unchanged. This Notes: The model is given by equation (1) in the text. is the standard deviation of the unobserved effect , and is the latent intra-group (establishment) correlation. The model specification in the first column also contains 16 regional dummies (10 and 6 for western and eastern Germany in the second and third columns of the table, respectively), 37 two-digit industry dummies, and 8 year dummies. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. (2001, …, 2008) survey is a unit born in 1999 (2000, …, 2007) . Consequently, all year 2008 births (i.e. establishments born in 2008) are discarded in our subsequent survival analysis. Also note that all establishments born in, say, 2002 but not observed (surveyed) before 2006, for example, are dropped from the sample. In other words, only those establishments that can be followed from the outset (year of birth) are included in the estimation sample. Exit means rotation out of the panel due either to attrition or failure (end of the initial state). Anycb is a dummy variable signifying the presence of any type of agreement. Notes: The within effect is always statistically significant at the .01 level, while the between effect is never statistically significant. Taking the panel (a) results for illustrative purposes, the between effect in row (5) is given by row (3) minus row (1) for 2000, and the within effect in row (6) is given by row (2) minus row (5), or the 2000-2008 percentage point change in row (2) minus the between effect. Alternatively put, if is the 2008 (predicted) coverage based on year 2000 coefficients, then the between effect is given by and the within effect by , where the reference groups are the year 2000 coefficients and the year 2008 characteristics, respectively (see text). The results in panels (b) and (c) can be similarly interpreted. Our selected vector of covariates includes establishment size, the proportion of skilled and female workers, and dummies for single-establishment status, foreign ownership, establishment age, state of technology, industry and region.
